'5' Physies and Magie Disenchanting Nature1 Gregor Schiemann Introduction A widespread view of the natural seien ces holds that their historieal development was accompanied by a constantly widening gap between them and magie. Originally closely bound up with magie, the seien ces are supposed to have distanced themselves from it in a long-drawn-out process, until they attained their present magic-free forrn. 2 1 would like, in this essay, to discuss same arguments in support ofthis plausible view. To this end, I shall begin with adefinition of magieal and seientifie eoneepts of nature adefinition appropriate to the considerable length of time from the beginnings of seien ce (which ean plausibly be plaeed in Greek antiquity) tothe present day. One ean define as 'magiea!' a eoneept of nature whieh asserts the possibility of gaining knowledge of secret natural forces, and the possibility of man's influencing same ofthem. These forces are 'secret' in several senses. Their pr€sumed effieaey springs from a hidden, meaningful nexus that eomprehends the whole of nature, and is often dependent upon the knowledge ofthis nexus. Also, one can know ofthese forces, and in some cases influence them, only in th e context of actions not accessible to ev€rybody.3 This definition by no means covers the whole speetrum of coneepts included in the idea of magie, but ean be put forward to gain an initial orientation to the relationship between many of the varieties of magie and the seienees.4 Natural scienee, in contrast to magie, denies the exist~ ence of secret forces. From the scienti-ne standpoint, a force is 'secret' only as lang as it remains unknown. Scientific statements about nature may not be founded on assumptions or practiees that are restricted to only a small eirele of the initiated. Seientifie knowledge should be testable under conditions that ean be repeated, and it claims unlimited inter-subjeetive validity. However, the last eentury's historiography of seienee has taught us that the application of sueh a systematic distinetion between magie and seienee ean be very problematic. The magieal and the seientifie understanding of nature influeneed one another so elosely that it seems questionable whether a terminological differentiation b~tween them ean be sustained. This is, for example, the ease with a good deal of physieal and ehemieal research in the late Middle Ages and the Early Modern period. Thus alchemieal notions, for example, elassifiable as belonging to the sphere of magie, played an important role in the formation of modern seientifie theories in these subjeets.5 However, the historieally important areas of overlap between seienee and magie go only some way towards qualifyinq the thesis '54 Physics and Magie, Disenchanting Nature of a steadily widening gap between the two modes of understanding of nature. The links between magie and natural seienee in medieval and modern alehemy to stick with the example already mentioned involved only some aspeets of these two lines ofreseareh, and were al ready deaTly different from the very elose links that had subsisted between these two areas ofknowledge in aneient GTeeee. Besides, they were of short duration. To exemplify the gap whieh, over several epoehs, widened between the magical and the scientific understanding of nature, I would Jike to examine two con* cepts in natural science, both assumed by physics, in historicaJ sequence. My in* quiry thereby restriets itself to eoneepts fundamental to the formation of theory in a scientific discipline, and seJects only two themes illustrative of the separation ofthis science from magie. Physics is suitable for this purpose, because it has funetioned as a leading diseipline from the beginnings of natural seien ce to the present day, dealing with matter in its various conditions of state and motion and its reciprocations. The first coneept I seleet is Aristotle's eoneept of physis (<pum,). It was fundamental to the emergenee of physies, and set its mark on thought in this field right up tothe beginning ofthe modern period. By means ofthis eentral eoneept ofhis physies Aristotle distaneed himselffrom earlier magieal notions of nature, though he was unable to prevent his eoneept being invoked bythe magie both ofthe Middie Ages and ofthe Modern Period. The reason fOTthe eontinuing ambivalenee of the concept physis. towards magie derives, in my view, essentially from the ambiguity of the contTast thought to subsist between it and aTt, ie. teehne (TEXV~) (seetion 2). PhYSis and teehne aTe, in ATistotle, eontTasting teTms, and denote two mutually exdusive pTineiples and spheTes of Teality. They still eOTTespond elosely enough to pTesent-day modes of thought in everyday Iife to be translatable by the wOTds 'natuTe' and 'aTt:' (HoweveT, as they refeT to only two ofthe meanings eontained in the semantie complexes ofboth teTms, they should actually be ealled 'ATistotelian natuTe' and 'Aristotelian art:) To show the Tesult, in histoTY, of this opposition of phYSiS to teehne, I will show how, in the ease of alchemy, both its defendeTs and its crities availed themselves ofthis opposition (seetion 3). The distinctive characteristic of the second concept of nature is negative, consisting in the elimination of the Aristotelian distinction between physis and teehne. The criticism was direeted, though by no means exelusively, against aTguments which have re course to Aristotelian physics to support a magical view of natuTe. Champions of magie asserted that their teehne of magie peTfeeted physis fOT man's purposes. Against this, the champions of modern thought hold that all teehnieal opeTations are subject to the laws of natuTe, and ean theTefoTe only modify natuTe within set limits. I eonsider Galileo Galilei to be a tTail-bla2eT fOT this anti*magical position, as weH as a co-founder of experimental science with his meehanieal and astronomieal works (seetion 4). With Galileo's rejeetion of the distinction between physis and teehne my inGregor Schiemann quiry is essentially at an end. As a eondusion I will say something of the relationship ofmagicto eoneepts of natuTe typieal ofthe following peTiod, both in physies and otheT natuTal seien ces (seetion 5)* In as much as my investigation confines ltself to questions concerning the understanding of natuTe, lexelude fTom eonsideTation the contexts in whieh natural seien ces and magie were aetually pTaetised. TheTe aTe to date haTdly any analyses dealing with a eompaTable peTiod and foeusing on the praetieal modification of nature.1 However different practically oriented investigations may be in otheT Tespeets from those undeTtaken horn the peTspeetive of the histoTY of ideas, I believe the two kinds of inquiTY would come to Temarkably similaT conclusions as regaTds the development ofthe relationship between natural seienee and magie. For, for one thing, the present-day marginalisation ofmagic as a m~ans ~f investigating nature and its alm ost complete lnsignificance for natural SClence lS obvious and a fact without historieal preeedent. For another, the disenehanting of nature that has led to this situation is to a large extent undisputed. It ean be described by reference to various factors comprising conceptions and practices, three ofwhieh I wishto stress, _ The disenchanting of-nature feStlaS fTOm a historie pTOcess of rationalisation whieh affeets the aequisition and proeessing of knowledge of nature, aecumulates increasing social significance as 1t goes on, and assumes an understanding ofrationality, whieh is eoneeived more and more instrumentally. .It is also among the consequences of an increasing empiricisation ofthe ba* ses of natural seien ce, by whieh means the relevanee of a universally aeeepted fund of empirical statements continues to grow. _ Finally, it has been furtheTed by a progressive mathematisation of the knowledge of nature, which changes the empirical basis into quantified and measur* able data to render it ealculable and therefore predietable in its future development.8 Interpretations of the term 'nature' constitute, to be sure, only one facet of these general tendeneies. But their historieal extent (oveT several epoehs) allow such interpretations to offer the advantage of a eriterion applieable over a long period. It is all the more sUTprising that in investigations of the relationship between magie and natural science in the history of ideas, a merely mC1dental1m* portanee was attributed to the eoneept of nature.' Aristotle's Contrasting 01 Nature and Art'" Aristotle's physies provided the natural seien ces with a classieal rational foundation that remained dominant until weil into the nineteenth eentury. Aristotellan natural seien ce is characterised by a systematic structure that claims to aehieve completeness, general validity, truth." Its objeet, physis, is eharaeterised by the principle of self-movement claimed, in physics, to be obvious to everybody.12 155 ,,6 Physie5 and Magie: Disenchantlng Nature Self-movement means that all natural things have in themselves "a beginning of change and durability, in partrelated to space, in partto growth and decay. in part to change of condition."13 Jn contrast to modern science, Aristotle has no cancept of a Jaw of nature. Natural processes on earth follow their structural principles only "with regularity."'4 If, in the sublunary world, what is normally expected does not happen, then some "hindrance" has prevented iV5 In the context of physis as teleologically conceived, hindrances occur either as mistakes or by chance. Mistakes differ fram usually expected results, Aristotle argues, adducing freak-births and miraculous appearances as examples.'6 AccidentaJ events differ fram what normally happens not in the result, but in the lack of necessary cause. The accidental result has no inner relationship to what happened before.'7 Jt comes about spontaneously, remains inexplicable and unpredictable. Although Aristotle, in contrast to his predecessors (whom he also calls "magicians"'8) undertakes a complete rationahsation of knowledge of nature, nevertheless the teleology of his nature leaves blank slots to be filled by accidents and mistakes. In terms of AristotJe's physics, human art also represents a divergence fram the regularity of nature. In contrast to natural things, those that result from art are not moved by themselves but by something external to them, "On the contrary, a bed, or artiele of elothing, or whatever other elasses of things there may be besides, (in so far as it meets this designation and is an object made by art) has no inner impulse towards alteration."19 The operations of art are located in between the sciences characterised by generalised knowledge physics being one of them and experience, which is typified by partieular knowledge about individual things. '" The relationship between techne andphysis is treated by Aristotle in his physics, where he describes it as imitation and completion. "In general terms, art sometimes completes what nature cannot bring to term, and sometimes emulates nature."21 Techne as the imitation of physis does not imply a reproduction of physis; rather, it means that art shares structural principles of processes with nature, physis being the souree of these." 80th these spheres of reality can be investigated by means of the same fundamental conceptual categories (matter-formdeprivation, potentiality, actuality) and explained by the main kinds of causality (impulse to change/movement. matter, form, goal). In this sense therefore the products of art are rationally comprehensible.l3 Techne succeeds in completing physis when it eloses gaps in the teleology of nature for the accomplishment of human intentions.<4 That is, techne not only repairs the f1aws and coincidences of nature in cases where they run counter to human intentions it also brings phenomena to pass which cannot be produced by nature. Water f10ws downhilI by nature, but it is sometimes desirable for man that it should f10w uphill. Art brings this about by the construction of wells." As the extrapolation of what is already potentially present in physis, the completion shows a relationship with Gregor Schiemann imitation. Thus nature is primary, art is seeondary and derived fram the primary. Sut techne is also essentially alien to natural processes. This is already expounded in texts ascribed to Aristotle himself, albeit less elearly than in those that probably come from later authors. A good example of this is the Mechanical Problems, which shows that the artifieiaJ operations earried out against physIs are unllmlted in scope. ,6 The completion of physis goes beyond physis to occupy a sphere of artifieeto which physis, in its imperfection, 15 subordinate. . . Although the concept of techne originating in Aristotle is ambiguous m 1tS relation to physis, the post-Aristotelian interpretations of this relation generally take as their starting point a difference between physis and techne in a way that remained fundamental to medieval and early modern thinking. MedievaL ALchemy as an ExampLe ofthe AmbivaLenee 01 AristoteLian Physies and Magie In orderto diseuss the ambivalent relationship between AristoteHan physics to magic exemplifying it by means of medieval alchemy, I must first clarifywhether the magical, alchemical and Aristotelian concepts of nature CUTTe nt at that t1me are sufficiently related to one anotherthematically. I characterised as 'magica)' an understanding of nature that asserted the possibility of recognising hidden forces immanent in a meaningful nature, and the possibility that some of these might be infiuenced by man. Many ofthe thought pracesses in medievaJ alchemy meet this definition. Alchemists generañ consldered themselves as members of seCTet societies whose thinking was gUlded by a eomprehenslve symbolism of nature, and whose goal was the manufacture ofthe 'philosopher's stone: In so far as the procedures applied to this end were compafable to the crafts of the artisan, alchemy was considered, in the Middle Ages, to be an "ars mechanicae."~7 In addition, it was often associated with magie by outsiders, as the reason alchemists could infiuence the hidden forces was thought to be their participation in supernatural forces. The alchemists themselves by no means always eonsidered themselves to be magi~ians. In partie,ular many .õ them rejected the classification oftheir art as demomc, or so-called black maglC. On the contrary several a1chemists considered themselves commltted to the co.ntrasting 'white' or 'natural' magie whose goal was the improvement ofhuman llfe through theunderstanding and modification ofnature.18 . Along with Plato's philosophy of nature and Neo-Platonism, Aristotle's phySlCS can also be reckoned among the theoretieal bases of medieval alchemy.Adm1ttedly no unified and self-consistent alchemical system can be document:d for any period.29 Sut in the various eonceptions, expllcit references to ATlstotl~ 5 ~hySlCS can be found nearly everywhere. They range from the individuation pnnc1ples of matter and form to the doclrine of the elements and the teleologieal concept of the whole ofnature right through to the opposition of physis to techne.'o '57 PhySics and Magie: Disenchanting Nature But Aristotle's physies not only eonstituted an important point of referenee for aJchemical ideas. His work was also of decisive authority for those who criticised alchemy. This double function of Aristotle's physies whieh played a role also in the dlVergent evaluations of the relation between physis and techne is retleeted in the ambivalence of Aristotelian physies to magie. As a representative author, who, applying Aristotle's thought, rejected alchemy, I would Iike to name the Persian philosoph er Avieenna (approx. 98o-1037).l' H,S ar~,u:nent, conducted in his work "On the congelation and coagulation of stones ( Oe congelatlOne et conglutinatione fapidum,,),,2 says that no human art can transform a naturally occurring baser metal into a more valuable and also naturally occuTTing metal, because, according to Aristotle, artificial and natural objects are essentially different. The reasons brought to bear against this view and these also appeal to Aristotle exalt the power of the art of alchemy above that of nature. Thus Albertus Magnus (about 1200-1280) explains the possibility of alchemlCal transformation of the properties of metals as being the exchange of forms WhlCh are compatibJe with a basic material common to all metals. The techne of alchemy is supposed to replace the impure by the purer form. Albertus compares the procedure of the alchemist with that of the art of medieine whieh Aristotle, too, had c1assified as a techne. Just as doctors purified the body df a siek patlent, so dld alchemists purify material to put it into a better condition}l While Albertus's justification of alchemy restricts itselfto its rather instrumental charaeter, Roger Bacon (about 1214-1292), in his Aristotle-oriented philosophy of the opus tert/Um (1266), elevates that art to the status of abasie science because of its ability to lay bare and to alter nature, arguing that the whole science of medieine and of nature should spring from alchemy.l4 Further examples of the argument over alchemy could be cited until weil into the sixteenth century." Arguments both for and against magieal concepts avail themselves of the conceptual ambiguity of the relations between the contrasting notlOns of phySIS and techne. While the idea of physis permits the appearance of phenomena which contradict the general run of natural occurrences, the idea of tech.ñ conceives all technicaJ operations together as a non-natural procedure recogmsmg no natural limits to its ability to change reality. On the other hand, both phySIS and techne are subordinated to shared rational principles whieh explain phenomena principles that can be adduced against magical cancepts. GaLileo's Elimination of the AristoteLian Opposition of Techne to Physis As the opposition of physis to techne was such a fundamental determinant in medieval and early modern thought, so the process of dealing with and critieising lt m phySlCS was cOTTespondingly prolonged. This process can be traced back to the medieval theory of impetus." it determines the foundation of modern me- '58 chanics, and does not near its end until the early nineteenth century with the Gregor Schiemann formulation ofthe principle ofthe conservation of energy. The whole process is an argument about basic physical concepts and theories, an argument so important as to provide us with a criterion to distinguish one epoch fram another in the history of science. The elimination of the opposition between physis and techne allowed nature to be investigated by means of technical constructions, without restrietion. Technology as an object of natural science first opened the door to the development of the experimental method whieh led to where scienee is now. By this method the laws of nature were discovered and/or tested under artificial, repeatable laboratory eonditions. Conversely, it became possible to think of nature not only as a model ofhuman art, but to think of nature as actually bemg a technical construct. Nature became a mechanism, and mechanics was promoted to the status of the leading science. Compared to these innovations, which determined the further development of the natural sciences, the devastating consequenees for magic of the elimination of the categorieal differenee between physis and techne seem merely an incidental matter. In a world in whieh man's ability to modify nature is subordinated to generally comprehensible laws, there is no Ion ger anyplacefor secret magical knowledge. . In Galileo, whose work I shall use to exemplify the critique of the Aristotelian opposition of physis to techne a lack of interest in magical inquiries is alreadyto be seen inquiries which still dominated the minds ofhis contemporaries. Alexandre Koyre, the science historian, aptly if with some exaggeration typified the culture ofthe time as one in which "gloomy superstition was dominant, magic and witchcraft [ ... ] were far more widespread than in the Middle Ages," and "astrology [ ... ] played a far greater role than astronomy."17 Yet we find Galileo living in this time and free of all enthusiasm for magie. In his work he deals with themes belonging to the wider field of magical cancepts only ineidentally, and in the cantext of the mechanical and astronomical topics that interested him}s In some places he mentions astrology positively, sometimes using arguments wh ich can be matched in the writings of Johannes Kepler.39 But his astronomical discoveries and theories do not derive their claim to validity from the assumption of hidden intluenees emanating from the stars, but from phenomena in the sky that anybody with a telescope can observe. In other sections of his work he distances himself strictly from alchemieal interpretations of nature. To discredit the Aristotelian erities of his discoveries and theories, he scorns (in, for example, the "Dialogue Concerning the two Chief World Systems") the search for the 'philosopher's stone' that enjoyed among them such high repute. How ridieulous is their beliefthat they ean find in texts from bygone epochs the seeret ofmaking gold. "Nothing is funnier," he writes, than to hearthe alchemists' commentaries "on ancient poets.'ll-o Galileo wrote no elaborated eritique of alchemy or any other related form of magie. His most important contribution to the dispelling of the cancepts basic to these proeedures was of a practical nature. He praetised and propagated technical-experimental research into nature and mathematical models for the results '59 Physics and Magie: Disenchanting Nature thus gained. Accordingly, in the discussion of mechanical instruments and their potential for modifying nature, he came to terms with the concepts of techne that went back to Aristotle. In the introduction to his early treatise "Mechanics,"'S93, he criticised the belief ofthe "Mechanici," that they "can move and raise the heaviest weights with little effort, intending thereby, with their machines, to cheat nature, ta some degree."41 They deceived themselves concerning the "immutable characteristics" af nature which is such "that no resistance can be overcome by a force weaker than itself is.'~.! Using simple mechanical deviees he showed that the work expended on them did not depend on the pracedures used each time, but only on the resulls attained. Looking back on these investigations, he wrote in a letter to Ciampoli (1625) that through many experiments he had convinced himselfthat "nature cannot be conquered ar deceived by art:\i3 Galileo had recourse to experiments with technieal apparatus and thought experiments relating to these, to help him formulate invariably valid laws of nature whieh all arts obey as weil. His orderly nature knew ofno hidden forces whose efficacy revealed itself to initiates alone. The comprehensibility of his physics, achievable for anybody, corresponds to the epistemological status of the technical constructians by means of which natural laws are discovered and/or tested for the constructions are fully understandable. By becoming part of a generally available technolagy, natural research parts company with the nation of secret knowledge, which includes magie Galileo is only one of the founders of modern science. üthers, like Johannes Kepler or Giordano Bruno before hirn or Isaac Newton after hirn, attach more importance to magical concepts. The initial restriction ofthe revolution in physks to research into astronomy and mechanics left room, on the one hand, for various concepts in the philosophy ofnature among which the magieal systems were to persist. On the other hand the narrower definition of the research areas and methods proper to physics resulted in a specialisation whieh, in its subsequent development, totally excluded every function of comprehensive world-pictures fram the forming of scientific theories. Conctusion Galileo formulated neither an elaborated critique of magical interpretations of nature, nor any alternative to Aristotle's concept of nature. New and fundamental definitions of nature were not worked out untillater, by philosophers like Rene Descartes, Baruch Spin02a and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibni2, to name only a few important thinkers. Among these, Descartes with his distinction between nature and mind achieved an importance that has remained relevant to discussions of natural philosophy to the present day. Descartes integrates into his cancept of nature the whole field of Aristotle's techne, and of his physis, too, except for that Gregor Schiemann part ofthe human mind whieh he sees as the mind of a thinking '1,' and whieh he sets up as an opposite principle to nature. In contrast to mind, nature is, as simply extended substance, completely predietable, mathematically describable, and belongs entirely in the subject-area ofmechanics. A discussion of Descartes's dualisrn and the natural philosophies that eame after hirn could show that these, not only in their original substanee-theoretical form, but also in tempered-down but still dualistie variants, leave room for magical thought Within the realm of mind thought of as completely independent of nature the belief in the possible existenee of extra-sensory forces able also to lTIfluence physical things, remains irrefutable. Such magic-related conceptions play, however, no role in Deseartes's scientific refleetions, whieh are not able to include the human mind, opposed as it is to the realm of nature. In Cartesian thought, magie has already been fully excluded fram the realm ofnatural science. The footholds stillieft for magieal thinking as a result ofthe opposition between nature and mind do not disappear until the advent of a concept of nature which interprets all manifestations of eonsciousness and action as natural phenomena. This natural1stic concept characteristic of present-day research, has gained influenee in physics as weIl. I would like merely to mention here that in the last hundred years physics has lost its role of leading discipline that it had enjoyed ever since antiqulty. The eompletely novel ways of discussing magie scientifically which follow fram the naturalistic concept are more important for the relationship between seientific and magical interpretations of nature. These two interpretations no longer oppose one another as two different modes of knowing which relate to one another reciprocally. Rather, the occurrence of magieal beliefs becomes a phenomenon to be investigated by science. Thus the relationship between seientifie and magical interpretations of nature is turned upside down. The question is no longer whether magie can possibly influence nature, but rather, what sort of natural phenomenon is the belief in magie. What scientifie explanation can be found for the fact that people believe in the efficacy of forces _ and in the possibility of influencing these when these forces are, fram a seientifie point ofview, non-existent? The legitimacy of such questions opens a further _ and presumably not the last chapter in the history of the relationship between magical and scientific interpretations of nature. 'Translated fromthe German original byJohn Fowler, universitätstuttgart. 2 Examples of this interpretation are, among others, James Frazer and Lynn Thorndike. Also. JeanJacques Rousseau; "Indeed, one may consult the annals of the world [ ... ]. but one will never find the origins ofthe sciencesto be asonewould wish them. Astronomytook its risefrom superstition, [ ... ] and natural sciences form idle curiosity" (Discours sur les sciences et les arts 45). Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: "Mankind's first relationshipwith nature was in fact magical~ (Sämtliche Werke. 2.Abteilung. Notes ", Physles and Magie: Disenehanting vol. 3, 363), and Norbert Elias: "The liberation from the double bind [Doppelbinder] that had held man. " kind 50 long on the magical-mythic level oflife inthe state ofnature, could hardly have happened as a , short-term event» (DerFischerimMahlstroml16).All English versions here by John Fowler. 3 The qualifications are intended to enable astro)ogyto be incJuded in the concept ofmagic. The influence ofthe stars is neither dependent upon the knowledge of their conste!1ations, nor can it be influ. enced 4 For the concept ofmagic, cf. Kurt Goldammer,Magie, Bert Hansen, Science and the Magic 484ff., Bronis. law Malinowski, Magie, Wissenschaft und Religion 71, Kurt Goldammer, Der Göttliche Magier und die Magierin: Natur, Religion, Naturmagie und die Anfänge der Naturwissenschaft vom Spätmittelalter bis zur Renaissance J4ff.. Claus Priemer, "Magie." S This insight derives in Jarge measure f,om Lynn Thorndike, The History of Magie and Experimental Science and Frances A, Yates, ~The Hermetic Tradition in Renaissance Science," For a criticism, cf. Brian Vickers, "Introduction" 3ff, 6 Gregor Schiemann, Natur, Technik, Geist: Kontexte der Natur nach Aristote/es und DeKartes in /ebensweltlicher und subjektiver Erfahrung, 7 The secondary literature on the relationship of natural science to magic is predominantly oriented towards the history of ideas. Cf. lynn Thorndike, The History of Magic and Experimentalscience, Bert Hansen, "Science and the Magic," Bronislaw MaJinowski, Magie, Wissenschaft und Religion, Brian Viel<. ers, Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, Jean-Frañois Bergier, Zwischen Wahn, Glaube und Wissenschaft.* Magie, Astrologie und Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Wayne Shumaker, Natural Magicand Modern Science, Richard Kieckhefer, Magie in the Middle Ages. 8 On the process of mathematisation, cf. Eduard Jan Dijksterhuis, Die Mechanisierung des Weltbildes. On the concept of quantification and measurement. cf, Gemot Böhme, "Quantifizierung Metrisierung." 9 Cf. footnote 7. The importance ofthe concept "nature" for medieval magie is pointed out by Hansen, sCience and the Magie 484ft., Goldammer, Der Göttliche Magier und die Magierin; Natur, Religion, Naturmagie und die Anfänge der Naturwissenschaft vom Spätmittelalter bis zur Renaissance 8ff., Christa Habiger-Tuczay, Magie und Magier im Mittelalter 176. The lasttwo do not deal with the conceptual relation between nature and art or skill, which Newman discusses for alchemy. In Vickers, Occult and Setentific Menta/Wes in the Renaissance, Wayne Shumaker, Natural Magic and Modern science and Richard Kieckhefer,Magic intheMiddleAges, the concept is notpaTtofthetheme. 10 'Art' (techne) as in 'art of medicine: 'artofhouse*building: etc. 11 On the difference between the dassical and modern concept of science, cf., in general. Alwin DiemeT, Der Wissenschajtsbegriffin historischem und systematischem Zusammenhang, and on physics, GregoT Schiemann, "Was heisst moderne Physikl". Il "Iho;; b' fOTtV 11 qr(1cno;;, 1tfLQuof}at öuitv{IYm YfAotOV' !pavEQovyaQ ön totOÜtO tu)v ÖVtfDV to't\v 1toÄAd": "It would be ridiculous to try to prove that there is such a thing as a natural condition. It is obvious that manyofthethings that exist areofthis nature" (Aristotle, Physics 111193 a3f.). Quotations fram Aristotle are indicated by book, chapter and paragraph according to Bekker's edition. '3 "tOUiOOV lI€vyaQ litoa-tov EV Ea\!TWssQxtJV I!XEt xlVl'tof{Õxat a-taOf<UO;;. Ta IIEv itaia i01tO\', in ö€ xa"t' OUSIIOW xat !peLeJl\', iaÖt XCl't' a).AOtWUtV" (Aristotle, Physics 111192 b 13ff.), cf. corresponding passage in llf 1 200 b 12, also VIII 3f., 253 b 5, and 254 b 17, Cf, for what folJows, Schiemann, Natur, Technik, Geist: Kontexte der Natur nach Aristoteles und Descartes in lebemweltJicher und subjektiver Erfahrung, chapter 1.1.1, GregorSchlemann 14Aristotle, Physics 118198 b 35f. 1'lbid.1I8199 a lof. and b 1]f.; IV 8 215a 23f. 16fbid.117197b 32ft. 171bid.118197b 19f, and b 36f. ,8 Aristotle, Metaphysics XIV 41091 b10. , ' t X(l!Y '9 ~X).[VT] öt xo\ Ll,ulnov, xal El lt lOtOVtoV 6).).0 YEVOo;; E01,Lv, 11 J.I€VTUUXYjXE ifl~ xUillyo(nw; txm:n:rl':; XU. ÖQov tOtLVssl"tOlEXVYjo;;, oilöEj.ltovoQJ.lilvlXHj.lElct~o).i1~ fJ.l{(lu'tOV~ (Aristotle,Physics 112 192 b 16ff.). On Anstotle's opposition of Nature andArt cf. in addition to Schiemann, Natur, Technik, Geist Kontexte der Natur h ArstoteIes und Oescartes in lebenswelt/icher und subjektiver Erfahrung, also Hans Blume~berg, nac I " dJ h' S hummer "Anstotle "Das Verhältnis von Natur und Technik als philosophisches Problem, an oac 1m c , on Technology and Nature." , , 10 "yiYVElnt öe ltXVT] ÖletV EX 1to).k&v Ti)~ EfllCElQiet~ tvvOT]flss"tOJV IlLa x(86).ou ytvT]lOl1tEQt lti:lV 0J.l0t{l)V u1t6J,.T]",*,t~:' "Art arise~ when, on the basis of many observations made from experience, a general (On* "pt of similar instances develops" (Aristotle, Metaphysics 11 981 a 5f t.). . "(A . totl PhyslCs 11 8 l1 "ÖAW~ öe f] dxvT] la fl€v &:rtneketü f]{(Iilot~ aöUVolEt Ct1tq;.yaouo8at, in öe fltflEtTat ns e, 199 a 15ft.). .1Ibid.2194a21f. . ' ke Realit 23 On this viewofthe standard interpretation of Aristotle, e.g. MIchael J. Moravcs1k. what Ma 5 y Intelligible? 24 Robin Smith, "FilJing in Nature's Deficiencies," 2S Aristotle,Meteorologyl11 353 b 27ft. 16 cf. Fritz Krafft, Dynamische und statische Betrachtungsweise in derantiken Mechan.ik. . l7 Bernhard Dietrich Haage, Alchemie im Mittelalter; Ideen und Bilder: Von Zoslmos bIS paracels~s ff M'rcea Eliade deals with the medieval and later association of craftsmanship and a1chemY]TI 44* 1 'h h' thefuturewas Schmiede und Alchimisten. Magic (as distinct trom a1chemy), along Wlt prop esymg , included among the 'forbidden arts.' Cf. also Habiger-TUczay, Magie und Magier.im Mitte/alter .. 1n and G ldammer Der Göttliche Magier und die Magierin: Natur, Religion, NaturmagIe und die Anfange der o , f d' 1 agictotechNaturwissenschaft vom Spätmittelalter bis zur Renaissance 14. The cJoseness 0 me leva m nique has been stressed in Hansen,Scienceand the Magie 495ff. and William famon, Technologyas ~a- gic in the Late Middle Ages and the Renaissance 171-212, and is documented and ex.emplified b.y J~aChl~ Schummer in "Aristotle on Technology and Nature" and Habiger*Tuczay in MagIe und MagIer Im MIt tela/ter 184ff. .8 Claus Priesner,Magie 227ff. 29 (laus Priesner and Karin Figala,Alchemie; Lexikon einer hermetischen Wissenschaft 8. 30 H Alchemie im Mittelalter: Ideen und Bilder: Von Zosimos bis Paracelsus18ff. 31 In a:~:t follows I am indebted to William Newman, "Technology and A1chemical Debate in the laie MiddleAges,"noteS9, , -". w.l 32 Avicenna, "Oe conge/atione et conglutlnatione lapidum: Bewg Sections of the KiUb al-Shifa,]TI l' ]" Newman "Technology andAlchemical Debatein the late Middle Ages" 427ff. . lam , f M th B ldwin "Al 33 Newman, "Technology and Alchemical Debate in the late Middle Ages" 431 ., ar a ~ , ... " f d K I Heinz Göttert Magie; Zur Geschichte des Streits um die magIschen Kun* bertus Magnus 21. an ar -, . . ste unter Philosophen, The%gen, Medizinern, Juristen und Naturwissenschaftlern von der AntIke bIS zur "3 Physics and Magic: Disenchanting Natt.!re Aufklärung 114f. 34Newman, ~Technology andA1chemical Debate inthe late MiddleAges~ 432f. 35 cf. the references provided ibid., note 59. 36 Hans Blumenberg, Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt174ff. 37 Alexandre Koyre, Cali/ei: Die Anfänge der neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft 84 and 82 38 Dne ofthetexts that deal with a theme belonging to the broaderfield of magical concepts considers the possible astral influence ofthe moons of Jupiter (letterto Biero Dini 1611, in Galileo Galilei, Le Opere XI 105-116). Galileothere counters the objection that the moons of Jupiter discovered by hirn cannot exist, as they don't appear anywhere in astrological practice, and this takes everything into account. GaUleo does not contest the basic astrological claim that the stars exert a manifold influence upon earthly affaiTs. Instead, he adopts the position that all such influences are conveyed by means oflight. But the light of Jupiter's moons is so weak that they need not be taken into account in astrological practices yet could none the less exist (cf. Volker R. Remmert, Ariadnefäden im Wisseschaftslabyrinth: Studien zu Galilei: Historiographie Mathematik Wirkung 2°7-2°9; I follow the account there given.). Galileo's openness vis avis astrology does not contradict his critique ofthe AristoteJian opposition (of physis to techne) as thatonly contestedany effective instrumental influencing ofnature, which is not cJaimed by astTology. 39 Darrel Rutkin, "Celestial Offerings: Astrological Motifs in the Dedicatory letters of Kepler's Astronomia Nova and Gah leo's Sidereus Nuncius." 4°GaJileoGalilei, Schriften, Briefe, Dokumente 1209. 41Ibid.68. 42lbld. 43 Letter to Ciamoli of 1625 in Galileo Galilei, Le Opere VIII 571 ff., cit. in StiJIman Drake, Galileo at Work 297f f. Works Cited '64 Aristoteles. Metaphysik. Trans. H. SeidL Hamburg: Meiner, '970. ---. Physik. Trans.H,G,Zekl.Hamburg: Meiner, 1987. Avicenna. Oe congelatione et conglutinatione lapidum: Being Sections ofthe Kitäb al-Shifii. Ed. and trans. E.J. Holmyard andD.C.MandeviJIe. Paris: Geuthner, 1927. Baldwin, Martha. "Albertus Magnus," in Alchemie; Lexikon einer hermetischen Wissenschaft. Ed. Claus Priesner andKarin Figala.Munich: Beck, 1998. Beckermann, Ansgar. Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes. BerJin: de Gruyter, 1999. Bergier, Jean-Frañois, ed. Zwischen Wahn, Glaube und Wissenschaft: Magie, Astrologie und Wissenschajtsgeschichte. Zurich: Verlag der Fachvereine, 1988. BJumenberg, Hans. "Das Verhältnis von Natur und Technik als philosophisches Problem." Studium Generale 4 (1951): 461-467- ---. Die Genesis der kopernikanischen Welt. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1975. Böhme, Gemot. ~Quantifizierung Metrisierung," in Am Endedes Baconschen Zeitalters. Ed. Gernot Böhme. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkarnp, 1993. Diemer, Alwin. "Der Wissenschaftsbegriffin historischem und systematischem Zusammenhang, ~ in Gregor Schiemann Der Wissenschaftsbegriff: Historische und systematische untersuchungen. Ed. Alwin Diemer. Meisenheim am Clan: Hain, 1970. Dijksterhuis, Eduard Jan. Die Mechanisierung des Weltbildes. Berlin : Springer, 1956. Drake, Stillman. Ga/ileoat Work: HisScientijicBiography. Chicago: U ofChicago P, 1978 Eamon, William. HTechnology as Magic in the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance." Janus 70 (1983): 171-212. Eliade, Mircea. Schmiede undA/chimisten. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1980. . Elias, Norbert. "Der FischeT im Mahlstrom," in Engagement und Distanzierung. Ed. Norbert Ellas. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 200 3. Galilei, Galileo. Le Opere. Edjzione Nazionale. 22 vols. Florence: Tipografiadi G. Barbera, 189°-19°9* ---,Schriften. Briefe, Dokumente. 2 vols. Ed. Anna Mudry. Munich: Beck, 1987. . Göttert. Karl-Heinz. Magie: Zur Geschichte des Streits um die magischen Kumte unter PhJIOSõhen, Theologen, Medizinern, Juristen und Naturwissenschaftlern von der Antike bis zur Aufklarung. Munich: Fink, 2001. Goldammer, Kurt. "Magie," in Historisches wörterbuch der Philosophie. Ed.Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971ff. ___ . Der Göttliche Magierund die Magierin: Natur, Religion, Naturmagie und die Anfänge der Naturwissenschaft vom Spätmittelalter bis zur Renaissance. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1991. Haage, Semhard Dietrich. Alchemie im Mittelalter: Ideen und Bilder: Von Zosimos bis Paracelsus, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1996. Habiger-Tuczay, Christa. Magie und Magier/m Mittelalter. Munich: Diederichs, 1992. . Hansen, B. ~Science and the Magic," in Scfence in the Middle Ages. Ed. David lindberg. ChiCago: U ofChicagoP, 1978. Kieckhefer, Richard.Magic in theMiddleAges. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990. Koyre ,Alexandre.Galilei: Die Anjängeder neuzeitlichen Wissenschaft* Berlin', wãenb~ch, 1988 . , Krafft, Fritz. Dynamische und statische Betrachtungsweise in derantiken Mechanik. Wiesbaden: Stemer, 197°* Malinowski, Bronislaw.Magie, Wissenschaft und Religion. Frankfurt am Main*. Fischer,1983* .. ". Moravcsik,J. Michael. "What Makes Reality Intelligible? Reflections on Aristotle's Theoryof Altla, m Aristotle's Physics. Ed. Lindsay judson. oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Newman, William. "Technology andAlchernical Debatein the late MiddleAges.~ Isis 80 (1989):423-445. Newman, William and Anthony Graf ton, eds. Secrets ofNature: Astrology and Alchemy In Early Modern Europe. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. . Priesner, Cl aus. "Magie," in Alchemie: Lexikon einer hermetischen Wissenschaft* Ed. Claus Pnesner and Karin FigaJa. Munich: Beck, 1998. . Priesner, Claus and Karin Figala. "Vorwort der Herausgeber," in Alchemie: Lexikon einer hermetIschen Wissenschaft. Ed. Claus Priesner and Karin Figala. Munich: Beck,1998. Priesner, Claus, ed.Alchemie:Lexikoneinerhermetischen Wissenschaft. Munich: Beck. 1998. Rernmert, Volker R. Ariadnefäden im Wissenschaftslabyrinth: studien zu Galile;: HistoriographieMathematikWirkung. Sem: lang,1997. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. "Abhandlung über die Wissenschaft und Künste (Discours sur les sciences et les arts),"inJean-Jacques Rousseau. Schriften. Ed. H. Ritter, VOI.l. Munich: Hanser, 1978. ,65 ." Physics and Magie: Disenchanting Rutkin. H. Darrel. "Celestial Offerings: Astrological Motifs inthe Dedicatory Letters ofKepler's ~stronomla Nova and Galileo's Sidereus Nuncius," in Secrets ofNature: Astrologyand Alchem m Early Modern Europe. Ed. William Newman and Anthony Grafton. Cambridge MA: The MI: Press,2001. ' Schelling. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 5" tl" h . am IC e Werke[Partl:vol1_1o; Part IJ: vol. 1-4. Ed K FA 5ch 11" 1 Stuttgart, 1856ff. . . '. e mg . Schiemann, Gregor "Washeisstm d Ph' ". o 0 eIne YSlk?, 1n EmergenceojModern Physics;Proceedings of Conjerence com~emorating a Centuryoj Physics. Ed. Dieter Hoffmann, Fabio Bevilacqua and:o er H. Struewer. Berhn 23 March-24 March 1995. Pavia; La Goliardica Pavese, 1996. 9 ---.Natur, Technik Geist-Kontexted N t h* . ,. er a ur nac Amtote/es und Descartes in lebensweltlicher und subjektlVerEr!ahrung. Berlin: deGruyter, 2005. Schütt, Hans-Werner. "Georg Ernst St hJ'" I . . . a ,]TI A chemIe: LexIkon einer hermetischen Wissenschaft. Ed Claus Pnesner and Karin Figala. Munich: Beck, 1998. . ;~hum~er, Joachim. "AristotJe on Technology and Nature." Philosophia Naturalis 38 (2001): 105-120 uma er, Wayne. ~atural MagicandModern 5cience; Four Treatises, 159°-1657Binghamton, N.Y.: . . cente~ fO,~ ~~dle.vaJ and Early Renaissance Studies, State University of New York, 19 8 9. Smlth, Robm. F1Jhng m Nature's Deficiencies," in Aristotle'sOntology. Ed. Anthony Preus andJ h p Anton.Albany. NY: State UP, 1992. 0 n . Thorndike Lynn TheHistory 1M . V . k '." . 0 ag/cand ExperimentaIScience.I_VIII. NewYork: Columbia UP 19'311 1C ers Bnan Introduct* ". 0 ' . , .' lOn, m ccult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance. Ed. Brian Vick Cambndge: Cambridge UP, 1984. ers. -", ed. Occult and 5cientific MentaJities in the Renaissance. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 98 Yates, FrancesA "The H t" T d" . ,1 4* . . erme 1C . ra ltlOn m Renaissance Science," in Art, 5cience, and Historyin the RenaISSance. Ed. Charles 5. SIngleton. Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Ur, 19 6 7. The Techno-Magician A Faseination Around 1900 Robert Stockhammer "Magiek," Aleister Crowley denees, "includes all aets soever. Anything may serve as a Magieal weapon; [ ... ] a Magieal Operation [ ... ] may be denned as any event in Nature whieh is brought to pass by Will. We must not exelude potatogrowing or banKing from our definition."! At around '900 magie becomes attrac~ tive to the degree that it was impossible to denne it by way of a definitio e contrario, ie. by indieating what it was not Ill-denned or somewhat arbitrarily redefined again and again, the signifier magie is less than a eoneept. It is, however, more than simplya metaphor, sinee magieal not ions of language preeisely state the im possibility of distinguishing between metaphorieal and literal usages of language. It is more than simply a word sinee it appears in well-ordered syntaetieal co-texts and pragmatic coñtexts whose Tules can be analyzed, and in which it can even be substituted by other words: in many contexts, for instanee, it works alm ost synonymously with 'energy.' Rather than searching for a common denominatoT of its confl1cting definitions, I will therefore point out several conditions for its attraetivity and its omnipresenee around '9°°, addressing magie (somewhat arbitrarily in my turn) as a figure in a speeine configuration. Even a superficial first look reveals that, from ,880 onwards, magie begins to playa crucial role in various disciplines. Master disciplines for the study of magie are, of COUTse, the history of religion and anthropology, and one nucleus of its cã reer is formed when these discipl1nes meet in an analysis of 'primitive religions' as is the case with Sir Edward Burnetl Tylor or Sir James George Frazer. One of the earliest (and eertainly one of the most interesting) Dutlines of a General Theory of Magie, the Esquisse d'une Theorie gent!rale de la Magie (19°2/03), is the produet of a collaboration between a elassieist, Hemi Huberl, and an anthropologist, Marcel Mauss. Since these studies point out the involvement of our 'own' European tradition with what is ealled magie, they nourish a wide-spread interest in anthropology, as, for instance, in the worKs of Bronislaw Malinowski, whose Trobriand tetralogy is one life-Iong effort to eome to terms with magie Cultural philosophy and the philosophy ofhistory, from Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolie Forms to Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno's Dialeetie of Enlightenment, will continue to rely on tripartite models of historieal evolutions as eoneeptualised by Frazer, with magie as a first stage. The Melanesian word mana introdueed into European languages by Max Müller as a synonym for magieal power and diseussed in detail by HubertiMauss plays a CTueial role for all ofthe "7 Kultur und Technik Schriftenreihe des Internationalen Zentrums für Kulturund Technikforschung [lZKT) der Universität Stuttgart herausgegeben von: Georg Maag, Helmut Bott, Gerd de Bruyn, Walter Gäbel, Christoph Hubig, Ortwin Renn Band 03 UT Magie, Science, Technology, and Literature Jarmila Mildorf / Hans Ulrich Seeber / Martin Windisch !Eds) UT